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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

DEERMINABL FZZ-Possm iTY oil IZ vER.-Professor Gray, in the
first edition of his great work, "The Rule Against Perpetuities," Section 31
and following, contended that the Statute Quia Emptores by putting an end
to tenure between feoffor and feoffee of an estate in fee simple, incidentally
put an end to possibility of reverter to the feoffer on failure of the condition in a determihable fee. Specifically he says that upon dissolution of
an eleemosynary corporation a terminable gift to such corporation does not
revert to the donor, as is said by Lord Coke, Co. Lir. I3b, but eschewts.
For reversion depends on tenure, and the Statute by destroying tenure ends
possibility of reverter. In his third edition, Section 4oa, he notes that since the
second edition of his book three cases have held contra;--North v. Graham.
235 Ill. 178, Pond v. Douglass, Io6 Me. 85, and Board of Chosen Freeholders
v. Buck, 779 N. J. Eq. 472. These follow a dictuin in First Universalist Society
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, which" he considers as opposed tQ a case not to be

distinguished from it, the leading case of Brattle Square Church v. Grant,
3 Gray i42. The learned author regafds Lord Coke's statement that land of
a corporation upon its dissolution reverted to the donor or grantor, while upon
the death of a natural person without heirs his land escheated, as based on
cases which do not uphold him, and the rule as not surviving his retirement,
for Johnson v. Norwai Winch 37, 1622, shows a great doubt on the part 'of
the judges, and thoigh the report does not give the final decision on the'
point, Lord Hale's MSS. cited Co. Li-Tr. I3b, Harg. note, say they held the
land escheated. Lord Coke seems to have but a dictun in one case to support
him, and only one'case that has ever followed it, GRAY Section 51.

NOTE AND COMMENT
In section 5Ia, of the third edition Professor Gray remarks that the only
case that has ever been decided in accordance with Lord Coke's remark is
289. "This case, as a deMott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 136 Ill.
cision, stands alone." This was true when the second edition of the RUzLE
AGAiNST PERPzs'zui-s appeared, but not in 1915 when the third edition came
out. By this time, in addition to the cases cited by Professor Gray, approving
the doctrine that there was possibility of reverter to the donor in case of a
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terminable gift to a charity, Presbyterian Church v. Venable, 159 Ill.
(1896), Miller v. Riddle, 227 Ill. 53, cases which he regarded as not actually
decided on that point though it certainly seems to be involved in the latter,
there was the further Illinois case cited by Professor Gray at Section 40 a,
i78 (i9o8), which notices and
but not at 5Ia, of North v. Graham, 235 Ill.
rejects as against the great weight of authority the view of Professor Gray.
It was -therefore not "the only case' when the third edition appeared. The
misstatement is due to the fact that Section 5Ia was taken over without
change from the second edition while 4oa appeared for the first time in the
third edition.
In his work on FuTURz INTERESTS, Professor Kales thinks it a matter of

surprise that the Illinois Supreme Court in the Danville Seminary Case should
have overlooked the masterly presentation of the matter by Professor Gray,
and ruled contra, but accounts for it by the suggestion that the rule adopted
by the court seemed a jast one. The land having been originally donated for a
purpose, and that purpose having failed, it seems more just that the land
revert to the heirs of the donor than escheat to the state. That this may be
the correct explanation is borne out by more recent cases. In Hart v. Lake,
273 Il. 6o, (i916), Mott v. Danville Seminary, supra, is again cited with approval, though the claimant is denied the aid of equity to enable him to recover the reverted property. 'But in County of Franklin v. Blake, 283 Ill. 292
(i918), the court refuses to recognize possibility of reverter in the case
of land purchased, not donated, for a charitable purpose, and on the distinct
ground that "where the owner donates land to iid a corporation organized for
a charitable or public purpose to carry out its objects, when the corporation
ceases to carry out the purposes of the organization and has no further use
for the land it is reasonable and just that it should revert to the 'donor, but
when land is bought by such corporation and its value paid the owner, we
can see no more reason why it shoud revert to the grantor than land purchased by a trading corporation", which all agree does not revert, but on
dissolution of the corporation is to be divided amofig the stockholders. However, this seems to prove too much, for the law knows no such distinction
between land kranted and land donated to a trading corporation, and in logic
the same follows in case of benevolent corporations. At all events the Illinois court holds that on the equities of the case, on the justice, but hardly
-the reason of the case, the donated lands of a dissolved eleemosynary corporation revert to the donor, while the granted lands do not revert to the
grantor, but go to the members or their representatives who put their money
into the buildings and work of the corporation, or, those failing, escheat to
the state. The court relies on McAlhany v. Murray, 89 S. C. 44o, annotated
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in Ann. Cas. 1913 A ioi2, and in io MXcH. L. Rzv. 121, as "an able and logical" discussion of the law. Strangely enough this case, though going on
the justice of the case, rejects the Illinois view of revetter to the donor; and
makes no distinction between donor and grantor, and this in face of the very
clear previous expressions of the South Carolina court contra. The case
contains an excellent discussion and review of the authorities, and rejects
Lord Coke's rule.
Finally it may be noted that none of these cases is decided on the legal
reason as distinguished from the equitable juitice, of the matter. They do
not discuss Professor Gray's thesis that a reversionary right implies tenure,
and that the Statute Quia Emptores by ending tenure between foeffer and
foeffee of a fee simple incidentally ended all possibility of reverter to donor
or grantor, and hence all determinable- fees. Thus a late English
case, Hastings Corp; v. Letton (19o8), i K. B.. 378, makes no distinction
between lease for years and fee simple. The statute applied only to
fee simple estates. If the Statute had that effect then, except in Pennsylvania and South Car6lina where tenure exists and the Statute Quia Emptores
is not in force, determinable fees with their possibility of reverter are, on
reason, extinct, whatever the justice of the case. Their absurdity in the ease
of trading corporations long ago led the courts to legislate them oui of existence without waiting for any statute. See the interesting discussion in Richards v. Coal and Mining Co. (igog), 221 Mo. I49. And it is precisely in
South Carolina where they might in reason be still in foice that the latest
pronouncement of the highest court is against them on the grounds of justice and equity. A short, but interesting, discussion of the soundness of Professor Gray's position may be read in the review of the first edition of his
book on the Rumx AGAINST PRPTUTIEMS in 2 LAW QUART. IZV. 394, and in a
resulting discussion by Professor Gray and Mr. Challis, .two masters in real
property law, in 3 LAw QUART. RZv. 399, 403. On the whole Professor Gray
seems to have the better of the argument and the worst of the decisions.
and it is perhaps well that it is so. To-base our modem rule as to disposition of the land, of a dissolved corporation upon a statute of 129o, and an
ancient, though not extinct, concept of tenure, certainly seems undesirable
if-the result violates our sense of reason and justice. It seems better to distribute such property to those equitably entitled on the facts of each-case.
Failing any such parties, escheat to the statp is.-jist. See io MicH. L. Rv.
121.
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